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INTRODUCTION: SANDEL’S AND DWORKIN’S CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE
As we did a year ago, we gather here at Boston University School of Law
for a symposium on justice. Last year, our topic was Ronald Dworkin’s then
forthcoming (and now published) book, Justice for Hedgehogs.1 This year, our
*

Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of
Law.
**

Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law. We
prepared this essay for the symposium on Michael J. Sandel’s Justice: What’s the Right
Thing to Do?, held at Boston University School of Law, October 14, 2010. We thank Eric
Lee for helpful research assistance. In Part V, in analyzing the California Supreme Court’s
decision recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, we draw from Linda C. McClain, Red
Versus Blue (and Purple) States in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: From Values
Polarization to Common Ground?, 77 UMKC L. REV. 415 (2008); Linda C. McClain &
Joanna Grossman, The California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples: Why Domestic Partnerships Are Not Enough: Part One in a Two-Part Series of
Columns, FINDLAW (May 27, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20080527.
html; and Linda C. McClain & Joanna Grossman, The California Supreme Court Rules in
Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples: How Conservative Reasons Led to a Progressive
Result: Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns, FINDLAW (May 28, 2008), http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/grossman/20080528.html.
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2010); Justice for Hedgehogs: A
Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming Book, 90 B.U. L. REV. 465 (2010).
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topic is Michael Sandel’s recent book, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?2
We think Sandel chose the more intelligible title! But we do have a quibble
with it. The title, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?, implies that Sandel’s
work is a book about personal ethics, how one ought to live one’s life. In fact,
it is a book about political philosophy, what we owe one another as citizens. A
better title would be “Justice: What Do We Owe Each Other as Citizens?”
Dworkin, alongside John Rawls, is the leading contemporary proponent of a
liberal conception of justice.3 As Sandel interprets these liberals, they think
about justice in terms of respecting freedom as distinguished from maximizing
welfare or cultivating virtues.4 Sandel himself is the leading civic republican
critic of such liberal conceptions of justice, interpreting them as holding that:
(1) law should be neutral concerning competing conceptions of virtue or the
best way to live, and (2) “a just society respects each person’s freedom to
choose his or her conception of the good life.”5 And he is the most prominent
civic republican proponent of conceiving justice in terms of cultivating virtues.
Nonetheless, we want to begin by pointing out some notable and unexpected
affinities between Dworkin’s and Sandel’s books on justice.
First, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin rejects neutrality and criticizes
Rawls’s political liberalism for bracketing conceptions of the good life in
arguments about justice.6 Instead, Dworkin defends an ethical liberalism and
argues for the integration of ethics, morality, and justice.7 So, too, Sandel
criticizes Rawls’s political liberalism on similar grounds and argues that we
cannot separate arguments about justice from arguments about competing
conceptions of the good life and of the virtues that a good society should
promote.8 Second, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin is concerned to
articulate the right process of moral reasoning.9 In doing so, Dworkin looks
back to Aristotle for an example of a holistic approach to such reasoning and
also looks to the relationship between questions of the good life and those of
the good polity.10 So, too, Sandel turns to Aristotle for a virtue-centered
approach that integrates moral reasoning about justice with reasoning about
moral virtues and conceptions of the good life.11

2

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? (2009).
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM xiv (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
4 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6-10, 19-21, 140-66.
5 Id. at 9.
6 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 263-64, 267-68.
7 Id. at 1-19, 117-20.
8 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 140-66, 246-51.
9 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 155.
10 Id. at 186-88.
11 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 9, 12, 184-207.
3
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Third, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin develops what he once called a
narrative view of life.12 Sandel has long criticized views like Dworkin’s as
forms of “voluntarist” liberalism that conceive the person as a freely choosing,
“unencumbered self” who is the “author” of his or her own ends and who can
stand apart from relationships and commitments.13 Yet in Justice, Sandel, like
Dworkin, stresses the importance of a “narrative quest that aspires to a certain
unity or coherence.”14 But Sandel draws his account of narrative from
Alasdair MacIntyre; Sandel’s account is more resonant with the notion of the
embedded self, or the self constituted by relationships with others and
commitments of communities of which we are members.15 We are, Sandel
contends, “storytelling beings” and “we live our lives as narrative quests.”16
Perhaps we can encapsulate the difference here by saying that for Dworkin, we
conceive ourselves as the authors of our stories, whereas for Sandel, we see
ourselves as players in a story we tell.
Finally, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues not only for “taking
rights seriously,” but also for “taking responsibilities seriously.”17 Dworkin
stands in contrast to other forms of liberalism grounded in the idea that the
state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life and the
idea that rights insulate right-holders from moral judgments about their
exercise. Rather, Dworkin argues that the state may encourage people to
exercise their rights responsibly, short of compelling them to do what the
government thinks is the responsible thing to do.18 Sandel, much like

12

In the penultimate draft of the book, Dworkin referred to a “narrative view of life.”
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 144 (April 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Boston University Law Review). In the published book, he deleted the phrase
“narrative view of life” and developed the idea in terms of the “capacity principle,” stating
that “living well means creating not just a chronology but a narrative that weaves together
values of character – loyalties, ambitions, desires, tastes, and ideals.” DWORKIN, supra note
1, at 244.
13 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 89-94, 175-83 (2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM] (criticizing conception of the “unencumbered
self”); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 522-25, 538 (1989) [hereinafter Sandel, Moral
Argument] (criticizing liberal conceptions of autonomy as reflecting a “voluntarist”
conception of the self).
14 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 221.
15 Id. at 221-22.
16 Id. at 221 (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 201 (1981)).
17 See James E. Fleming, Taking Responsibilities as Well as Rights Seriously, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 839, 839, 844 (2010) (analyzing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION (1993), and
DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1); Ronald Dworkin, Response, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1059, 1078-79 (2010) (indicating that Dworkin carries forward the arguments about
taking responsibilities seriously from Life’s Dominion to Justice for Hedgehogs).
18 Fleming, supra note 17, at 839-40.
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Dworkin, has criticized those very liberal conceptions of neutrality and of
rights as insulating right-holders from moral judgments.19
And so, we must ask, are Dworkin’s ethical liberalism and Sandel’s civic
republicanism as far apart as Sandel’s criticisms of liberal conceptions of
justice might lead us to expect? One might hypothesize that Sandel is right in
his criticisms of liberalism, and that Dworkin’s movement in Sandel’s
direction confirms the validity of his criticisms. Or, one might hypothesize
that Sandel is wrong about liberalism, and that Dworkin’s form of ethical
liberalism shows that Sandel’s criticisms are not well-taken. We assume that
Sandel would prefer the former hypothesis! And we are certain that some
liberals would insist on the latter. Our aim here is not to adjudicate this matter,
but merely to bring out some striking convergences between Dworkin’s and
Sandel’s books on justice.
More generally, in what follows, we want to suggest that the contrasts
between justice as respecting freedom and justice as cultivating virtues are not
as stark as Sandel has put them. The work of some liberal political theorists,
most prominently William Galston and Stephen Macedo, has narrowed the
distance between these two conceptions. These theorists have developed
attractive conceptions of civic liberalism, arguing persuasively that liberalism
has a proper concern with cultivating civic virtues.20 We too are working on
this terrain of civic liberalism in our book in progress, entitled Rights,
Responsibilities, and Virtues.21 This piece figures in that larger project.
I.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN SANDEL’S PRIOR WORK

In previous work, we have engaged with Sandel’s prior work concerning the
form that constitutional interpretation should take in the face of moral
disagreement and political conflict about basic liberties, such as the right to
privacy or autonomy.22 Sandel argued that in interpreting constitutional
freedoms like privacy, courts should move beyond liberal autonomy arguments
about protecting individual choices to republican moral arguments about

19

Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 533-38.
See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL P LURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2002); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3 (1991); STEPHEN
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 810 (2003); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 3-8 (1990).
21 JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES
(forthcoming) (on file with authors).
22 JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY
141-60 (2006); Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, In Search of a Substantive Republic,
76 TEX. L. REV. 509, 518-22 (1997) (reviewing, in part, MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996)).
20
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fostering substantive human goods or virtues.23 For this reason, Sandel was
critical not only of the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick24 for refusing
to recognize homosexuals’ right to privacy in their intimate associations, but
also of the dissenting opinions by Justices Blackmun and Stevens for making
liberal arguments sounding in choice and toleration rather than republican
arguments sounding in moral goods.25 Furthermore, Sandel argues that, in
Lawrence v. Texas,26 the Supreme Court should have justified protecting
homosexuals’ right to privacy not on the basis of homosexuals’ freedom to
make personal choices, but on the ground of the goods or virtues fostered by
homosexuals’ intimate associations.27
Unlike some liberals, who reject out of hand Sandel’s call for a civic
republicanism that engages in substantive moral argument, we argued that in a
liberal republican constitutional democracy such as our own it is appropriate to
make both liberal autonomy arguments and civic republican virtue
arguments.28 Accordingly, we argued that Sandel overstates the supposed
dichotomy between the liberal appeal to choice and the republican appeal to
moral goods.29 And we cautioned against his call for substantive moral
argument to the extent that it, on the one hand, would jettison liberal
commitments to toleration and autonomy and, on the other hand, would require
more ambitious moral argument than seems likely to be successful in
circumstances of deep moral disagreement and political conflict.30
Subsequent to our initial criticism of Sandel’s analysis of the right of
privacy as championed in the dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in
Bowers, we readily acknowledge that constitutional discourse, especially that
concerning gay and lesbian rights, has moved in Sandel’s direction. In Romer
v. Evans31 the Supreme Court struck down, as a denial of equal protection, an
amendment to a state constitution prohibiting measures that would protect
homosexuals against discrimination.32 The Court held that the amendment was
not rationally related to any legitimate governmental purpose but instead
reflected “animus” or a “bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”33

23

Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 521-22.
478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986).
25 Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 529-31, 533-39 (criticizing not only the
majority opinion of Justice White in Bowers, but also the dissenting opinions of Justices
Blackmun and Stevens).
26 539 U.S. 558, 564-79 (2003).
27 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 142
(2005).
28 FLEMING, supra note 22, at 154-60; McClain & Fleming, supra note 22, at 530-38.
29 McClain & Fleming, supra note 22, at 530.
30 Id. at 530-35.
31 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
32 Id. at 635-36.
33 Id. at 632, 634 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
24
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia implicitly paid Sandel a backhanded
compliment when he complained that gay and lesbian rights advocates seek
“not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality.”34 Sandel, in his critique of the liberal dissents in Bowers, had
advocated moving beyond arguments for empty toleration to arguments for
acceptance and appreciation of gays and lesbians.35
Several years after Romer, in Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that a state
law criminalizing same-sex sodomy violated a homosexual’s right to privacy
or autonomy.36 Justice Kennedy’s opinion declared that it “demeans the lives”
of homosexuals to respect the right of heterosexuals to autonomy without
respecting an analogous right for homosexuals.37 One of us (Fleming) did “a
Sandel” on Kennedy’s opinion,38 going through the opinion and singlemindedly differentiating the liberal strains from the republican strains.
Let us say that the liberal elements bespeak concern for choice,
autonomy, toleration, and bracketing moral arguments and disagreement,
while the republican elements bespeak concern for justifying freedoms on
the basis of substantive moral arguments about the goods or virtues they
promote, or on the basis of their significance for citizenship.39
My analysis showed that Lawrence reflects an intertwining of liberal and
republican concerns, emphasizing respecting autonomy together with securing
the status of free and equal citizenship for all.40 I argued that my liberal
republican constitutional theory “is tailor made to fit and to support arguments
and decisions weaving together such strands.”41 By contrast, Sandel’s civic
republican theory seems to call for substantive moral arguments to the
exclusion of liberal autonomy or toleration arguments.42
In Sandel’s own analysis of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, he too
begins by identifying the liberal autonomy arguments sounding in choice.43
But, Sandel clearly was heartened by Kennedy’s opinion. For, according to
Sandel, Kennedy’s opinion not only embodied liberal strands of choice, but
also “gestured toward” republican strands of moral goods, specifically that the
34

Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 533-38. For an elaboration of the contrast
between “empty toleration” and “toleration as respect,” see Linda C. McClain, Toleration,
Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 19 (1998).
36 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
37 Id. at 575, 578.
38 I coined this term – “a Sandel” – with the greatest appreciation and respect for Michael
Sandel. See FLEMING, supra note 22, at 154-60.
39 Id. at 154-55.
40 Id. at 160.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 154-60; McClain & Fleming, supra note 22, at 530-38.
43 SANDEL, supra note 27, at 142.
35
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statute “wrongly demeaned a morally legitimate mode of life.”44 Yet, Sandel’s
analysis implies that Kennedy’s opinion would have been still more persuasive
if it had been cast more fully in terms of republican moral goods along the
lines he urges.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,45 the decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognizing a right to same-sex
marriage under the state constitution, may be the fullest realization in a judicial
opinion to date of Sandel’s call for substantive moral arguments in justifying
constitutional rights. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion spoke of the moral
goods of marriage, most centrally “commitment,” but also “the ideals of
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.”46 But we hasten to
add that, even in Goodridge, republican arguments sounding in moral goods
stand side by side with liberal arguments sounding in choice, autonomy, and
toleration (as Sandel acknowledges in his analysis of Goodridge, to be
discussed below). Again, we want to suggest that this combination – synthesis
of liberal arguments with republican arguments – is as it should be in a liberal
republican constitutional democracy such as our own, and most certainly in
circumstances of deep moral disagreement and political conflict.
II.

SANDEL’S ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE IN TERMS OF
CULTIVATING VIRTUES

For the rest of this Article, we will examine Sandel’s argument about the
impossibility of liberal neutrality and the unavoidability of substantive moral
argument about moral goods and virtues in justifying constitutional rights. In
particular, we want to examine one example Sandel offers: the definition of
marriage and whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to marry. We
will focus on Sandel’s articulation of Aristotle’s method for addressing
questions of political conflict: an inquiry into office, virtues, and purposes.
Sandel proposes what he calls a third approach to justice, focusing on
cultivating virtues instead of maximizing welfare or respecting freedom. Under
Sandel’s approach, questions of justice are not just about freedom or welfare
but also about virtues and higher moral purposes. We think that Sandel’s
insight – that what is at stake in the same-sex marriage debate and many other
conflicts has to do with questions of worth and status – is quite powerful.47
His reliance on Aristotle as an exemplar of a virtue approach to justice is also
very helpful. We will consider to what extent Sandel’s conception is
compatible with the constitutional liberal approach to the relationship among
44

Id.
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
46 Id. at 954.
47 “Challenged by the insights of Michael Sandel,” Chai Feldblum advocates
“judgmental moral arguments” in support of marriage equality for same-sex couples. Chai
R. Feldblum, Gay is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 139, 157, 159 (2005).
45
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rights, responsibilities, and virtues that we are developing in our book in
progress.
Let us begin by sketching Sandel’s presentation of Aristotle’s conception of
justice in terms of cultivating virtues. Sandel asserts:
Debates about justice and rights are often, unavoidably, debates about the
purposes of social institutions, the goods they allocate, and the virtues
they honor and reward. Despite our best attempts to make law neutral on
such questions, it may not be possible to say what’s just without arguing
about the nature of the good life.48
Aristotle’s approach to justice, as Sandel recounts, has two central ideas:
1. Justice is teleological: Defining rights requires us to figure out the
telos (the purpose, end, or essential nature) of the social practice in
question.
2. Justice is honorific: To reason about the telos of a practice – or to
argue about it – is, at least in part, to reason or argue about what virtues it
should honor and reward.49
This approach, Sandel argues, differs from “[m]odern theories of justice,”
because the latter “try to separate questions of fairness and rights from
arguments about honor, virtue, and moral desert. They seek principles of
justice that are neutral among ends, and enable people to choose and pursue
their ends for themselves.”50 By contrast, Aristotle views questions of justice
as “unavoidably” bound up with “debates about honor, virtue, and the nature of
the good life.”51 Justice, for Aristotle, “means giving people what they
deserve, giving each person his or her due.”52
Thus, Sandel sets up a dichotomy between a liberal conception of justice as
respecting rights and an Aristotelian view of justice as being concerned with
forming good citizens. “For Aristotle, the purpose of politics is not to set up a
framework of rights that is neutral among ends. It is to form good citizens and
to cultivate good character.”53 Aristotle, in a passage Sandel quotes, criticizes
a political association that merely was “a guarantor of men’s rights against one
another” for being a “mere covenant” or “mere alliance,” instead of “being, as
it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and
just.”54 Sandel concludes that the “highest end of political association” for
Aristotle, “is to cultivate the virtue of citizens;” “politics is about something
higher” than promoting economic exchange or maximizing economic
48

SANDEL, supra note 2, at 207.
Id. at 186.
50 Id. at 187.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 193.
54 Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Book III, ch. ix, 1282b (Ernest Barker trans. &
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1946)).
49
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welfare.55 “It’s about learning how to live a good life.”56 Another implication
is that the institutions of social life should be means to the end of the good life.
We reject this dichotomy; our project is to develop a civic liberalism that
both supports rights and underwrites a formative project of inculcating civic
virtues of liberal citizenship. We, like other civic liberals such as Galston and
Macedo, are indebted to Sandel for inspiring us to think about a liberal
constitutionalism’s proper formative project. In the remainder of this Article,
we will elaborate some points of disagreement with Sandel. As in our prior
work analyzing Sandel, we will argue that it is not necessary to take an
either/or approach: making arguments sounding either in protecting freedom
of choice or in promoting moral goods. We should combine both types of
argument.
III. NOT ONLY NEUTRAL BUT ALSO NAKED: THE LIBERAL IDEA OF PUBLIC
REASON
Sandel argues that liberalism aspires not merely to state neutrality
concerning competing conceptions of the good life, but indeed to a naked
public square denuded of religious arguments and convictions.57 Here he
criticizes Rawls’s idea of public reason and conception of the Supreme Court
as an exemplar of public reason.58 Sandel quotes Rawls as providing this test
for whether we are following public reason: “[H]ow would our argument strike
us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion?”59 Rawls continues:
“The justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal morality, nor the
ideals and virtues of morality generally. Those they must view as irrelevant.
Equally, they cannot invoke their or other people’s religious or philosophical
views.”60 Interpreting Rawls, Sandel concludes: “Like Supreme Court justices,
we should set aside our moral and religious convictions, and restrict ourselves
to arguments that all citizens can reasonably be expected to accept.”61
President John F. Kennedy accepted this ideal of liberal neutrality, Sandel
argues, but President Barack Obama rejects it.62 Sandel asserts that “[f]rom
the 1960s through the 1980s, Democrats drifted toward the neutrality ideal, and
largely banished moral and religious argument from their political discourse,”
with Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy being the exceptions.63 By
55

Id.
Id.
57 Id. at 248.
58 Id. at 249-51. Rawls uses the formulation “exemplar of public reason.” RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 236.
59 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 249 (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at
31).
60 Id. at 249 (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 236).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 249-50.
63 Id. at 249.
56
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contrast, the religious right, beginning in the 1980s with the election of Ronald
Reagan and the launching of the Christian Coalition, sought to “clothe the
‘naked public square’” and attack the moral permissiveness of American life.64
Liberal and Democratic response was anemic, Sandel charges; even when
liberals spoke about “values,” they did so awkwardly and typically meant “the
values of tolerance, fairness, and freedom of choice.”65 Here, Sandel’s
example is John Kerry’s 2004 convention acceptance speech.66 Obama is the
hero of this story, with Sandel quoting at length from an Obama speech about
how “thousands of Americans” are coming to realize that:
[S]omething is missing . . . . They want a sense of purpose, a narrative
arc to their lives. . . . [I]f we truly hope to speak to people where they’re
at – to communicate our hopes and values in a way that’s relevant to their
own – then as progressives, we cannot abandon the field of religious
discourse.67
Sandel concludes, after excerpting this speech:
Obama’s claim that progressives should embrace a more capacious, faithfriendly form of public reason reflects a sound political instinct. It is also
good political philosophy. The attempt to detach arguments about justice
and rights from arguments about the good life is mistaken for two
reasons: First, it is not always possible to decide questions of justice and
rights without resolving substantive moral questions; and second, even
where it’s possible, it may not be desirable.68
This serves as Sandel’s springboard to considering several controversial
“culture war” issues: the abortion and stem cell debates and the same-sex
marriage debate.69 We have sketched Sandel’s criticism of the idea of public
reason, not to assess it in its own right – we will leave that undertaking to
Hugh Baxter’s article in this symposium70 – but to set the stage for our
discussion of Sandel’s analysis of same-sex marriage.
IV. SANDEL’S ANALYSIS OF GOODRIDGE, THE MASSACHUSETTS SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE DECISION
Sandel argues that the question of whether to recognize same-sex marriage
cannot be resolved within the bounds of liberal public reason, but instead
requires “recourse to controversial conceptions of the purpose of marriage and
64

Id. at 250 (quoting RICHARD NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984)).
Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. (quoting Barack Obama, Keynote Address at Call to Renewal Conference (June 28,
2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.
html).
68 Id. at 251.
69 See id. at 251-60.
70 Hugh Baxter, Sandel on Religion in the Public Square, 91 B.U. L. REV. __ (2011).
65
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the goods it honors.”71 Thus, arguments appealing to “liberal, nonjudgmental
grounds [–] whether one personally approves or disapproves of gay and lesbian
relationships, individuals should be free to choose their marital partners” – will
not suffice.72 Whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to enter into
civil marriage, Sandel argues, depends on arguments about the purpose of the
social institution of marriage, which means that we must argue about “the
virtues it honors and rewards.”73 He asserts: “The debate over same-sex
marriage is fundamentally a debate about whether gay and lesbian unions are
worthy of the honor and recognition that, in our society, state-sanctioned
marriage confers. So the underlying question is unavoidable.”74
Sandel argues this is so because the state may choose among three different
policies concerning marriage:
1. Recognize only marriages between a man and a woman.
2. Recognize same-sex and opposite-sex marriages.
3. Don’t recognize marriage of any kind, but leave this role to private
associations.75
Political theorist Tamara Metz has referred to this third option as “the
disestablishing of marriage,” by analogy to the disestablishment of religion.76
For completeness, we should round out these three with a modification of the
first position, which we will call Policy 4: restrict marriage to opposite-sex
couples, but create a parallel institution, whether domestic partnership or civil
union, for same-sex couples. Sandel notes that several states have done this,
but he doesn’t list it among the policy options.77
What about Policy 3, disestablishment of marriage? Even though it is
“purely hypothetical” and hardly anyone has embraced this proposal, Sandel
claims, it “sheds light on the arguments for and against same-sex marriage.”78
How so? It is a “libertarian solution” to the marriage debate because it
“privatizes marriage,”79 letting people marry as they please, without state
sanction or interference. To the extent that the controversy over altering the
definition of civil marriage entails religious disputes about marriage’s purpose,
this policy would allow the state to bypass such controversies by leaving the
definition of marriage to religious entities. Under Policy 3, what role would
the state have instead? Proposals vary. Liberal Michael Kinsley, for example,
71
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73 Id. at 253-54.
74 Id. at 254.
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DIVORCE 113-14, 119-20 (2010).
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suggests that the state could provide domestic partnership laws to address
economic and inheritance aspects of marriage.80 Feminist Martha Fineman
suggests that the economic subsidies now tied to marriage could be shifted to
the caretaker/dependent relationship, stressing that adult intimate relationships
could be handled by private contract.81 Similarly, liberal feminist Tamara
Metz argues for a new status, an Intimate Caregiving Union.82 She reasons
that this would get at the state’s most significant contemporary interest in
intimate relationships: intimate caregiving, and ensuring that dependency and
vulnerability are addressed in fair and just ways.83 But this new status, Metz
argues, would avoid the problem that now exists with state establishment of
marriage: because marriage is a comprehensive social institution, whose social
meaning and ethical authority stem from extra-governmental sources such as
religion, state regulation offends liberal principles of liberty, equality, and
stability.84
Sandel relates the disestablishment argument to the Aristotelian virtue
framework: “Since the state would no longer confer on any family units the
honorific title of marriage, citizens would be able to avoid engaging in debate
about the telos of marriage, and whether gays and lesbians can fulfill it.”85
Moreover, liberal neutrality would get a boost because this solution “does not
require judges or citizens to engage in the moral and religious controversy over
the purpose of marriage and the morality of homosexuality.”86 Sandel
contends that considering Policy 3 shows us that neither Policy 1 nor Policy 2
can be defended within “the bounds of liberal public reason”; considering the
disestablishment proposal helps us see, he contends, “why both proponents and
opponents of same-sex marriage must contend with the substantive moral and
religious controversy about the purpose of marriage and the goods that define
it.”87
Looking at the arguments on both sides of the issue bears out Sandel’s
contentions to a degree. Thus, he observes that opponents of same-sex
marriage argue that “the true meaning” of marriage would be dishonored by
altering marriage’s definition and they are not “bashful about the fact that
they’re making a moral or religious claim.”88 This is Sandel’s contention, but
we would point out that the arguments that opponents of same-sex marriage
make in court generally eschew religious language and appeal to grounds like
80 Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage: Let’s really get the government out of our
bedrooms, WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at A23.
81 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 123 (2004).
82 METZ, supra note 76, at 119-27.
83 Id. at 124-26.
84 Id. at 114-19.
85 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 256.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id..
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marriage’s procreative purpose, optimal childrearing for children, and the
importance of preserving tradition.89 By contrast, proponents of a right to
same-sex marriage, he says, “often try to rest their claim on neutral grounds,
and to avoid passing judgment on the moral meaning of marriage. The attempt
to find a nonjudgmental case for same-sex marriage draws heavily on the ideas
of nondiscrimination and freedom of choice.”90 But nondiscrimination and
freedom of choice alone, he argues, are not enough to justify a right to samesex marriage.91 Here he turns to Goodridge to explain why.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Goodridge, Sandel observes, begins with
a disclaimer – adapted from the Supreme Court in Casey and Lawrence – about
the court not taking sides in the dispute among competing moral, religious, and
ethical convictions about marriage and about whether same-sex couples are
entitled to marry.92 Marshall quotes Lawrence (itself quoting Casey): “Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”93
So far, this sounds like a liberal analysis: the right to marry is a matter of
autonomy and freedom of choice; to exclude same-sex couples denies them
“respect for individual autonomy and equality under law.”94 In Sandel’s gloss,
Marshall is saying that the issue “is not the moral worth of the choice, but the
right of the individual to make it.”95
But those grounds are insufficient, Sandel contends: if the state were truly
neutral, how could it draw any lines at all about who may marry, so long as the
relationships were voluntary?96 On what grounds could it prohibit polygamy?
He goes so far as to suggest that if the state truly wanted to be neutral, it would

89 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930-32 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(observing that, by contrast to arguments that proponents of Proposition 8 made in the
official campaign to pass it, which “conveyed to voters that same-sex relationships are
inferior to opposite-sex relationships and dangerous to children,” in the litigation over
Proposition 8, proponents stressed that Proposition 8 promoted marriage’s “central purpose”
of promoting naturally procreative relationships and promoted “‘statistically optimal’ childrearing households; that is, households in which children are raised by a man and a woman
married to each other”). Prominent conservative opponents may also eschew religious
arguments out of court. See Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is
Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 247 (2010) (contending that their argument for
“legally enshrining” the “conjugal view of marriage” requires “no appeal to religious
authority”).
90 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 256.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 257 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass.
2003) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)))).
94 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
95 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 257.
96 Id.
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have to “get out of the business of conferring recognition on any marriages”
(recall Policy 3 above).97
Instead, Sandel argues, “[t]he real issue in the gay marriage debate is not
freedom of choice but whether same-sex unions are worthy of honor and
recognition by the community – whether they fulfill the purpose of the social
institution of marriage.” He continues: “In Aristotle’s terms, the issue is the
just distribution of offices and honors. It’s a matter of social recognition.”98
Sandel finds in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion a nodding toward this view
of the matter. For example, in noting that the state is a third party to every
marriage, Marshall brings out marriage’s “honorific aspect”: “Civil marriage is
at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity,
and family.”99 Here, Sandel argues, she “steps outside the bounds of liberal
neutrality to affirm the moral worth of same-sex unions, and to offer a view
about the purpose of marriage, properly conceived.”100 What virtues or goods
does marriage honor, if it is “an honorific institution”?101 Sandel notes that
many opponents of same-sex marriage argue that the purpose of marriage is
procreation, and that since same-sex couples lack the natural capacity to
procreate, they lack “the relevant virtue.”102 Marshall directly addresses and
rejects this argument, locating marriage’s primary purpose – its sine qua non –
not in procreation, but in an “exclusive, loving commitment between two
partners.”103
Sandel next stands back to ask: “[H]ow . . . is it possible to adjudicate
between rival accounts of the purpose, or essence, of marriage?”104 Is it
“simply a clash of bald assertions” or is there some way to show that one
argument is more plausible than the other?105 Marshall’s opinion, he suggests,
provides a “good illustration” of how to proceed in such cases of conflict.106
Her method, he suggests, entails “an interpretation of the purpose or essence of
marriage as it currently exists.”107 She shows that “as currently practiced and
regulated by the state, [marriage] does not require the ability to procreate.”108
From this, Sandel extrapolates: if there are “rival interpretations of a social

97
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practice, . . . how can we determine which is more plausible?”109 He identifies
two ways. One way is “to ask which account makes better sense of existing
marriage laws, taken as a whole. Another is to ask which interpretation of
marriage celebrates virtues worth honoring.”110 Put another way, to determine
“[w]hat counts as the purpose of marriage” necessitates an inquiry about “what
qualities we think marriage should celebrate and affirm.”111 This, he
concludes, leads unavoidably to the “underlying moral and religious
controversy”: “What is the moral status of gay and lesbian relationships?”112
On this question of moral status, Sandel argues, Marshall’s opinion is not
neutral, but concludes that the relationships formed by gay men and lesbians
are as worthy of respect as opposite-sex relationships.113 When the state denies
same-sex couples the right to marry, it (quoting Marshall) “confers an official
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are
inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not
worthy of respect.”114 Thus, concludes Sandel:
[W]hen we look closely at the case for same-sex marriage, we find that it
cannot rest on the ideas of nondiscrimination and freedom of choice. In
order to decide who should qualify for marriage, we have to think through
the purpose of marriage and the virtues it honors. And this carries us onto
contested moral terrain, where we can’t remain neutral toward competing
conceptions of the good life.115
Sandel’s analysis is illuminating in important ways, but problematic in
setting up an either/or dichotomy between nondiscrimination and freedom of
choice, on the one hand, and virtues and purposes, on the other. We would
insist that the case for same-sex marriage does properly rest in part on “ideas
of nondiscrimination and freedom of choice.”116 Sandel is right, though, to
insist that it also entails inquiry into the purposes of marriage and requires
interpreting marriage as a contemporary social institution.
But we want to point out that one can offer an alternative reading of
Goodridge that does not require recourse to distinctively moral goods, much
less Aristotelian teleological moral analysis, and that does not go outside the
bounds of liberalism.
First, conventional constitutional law doctrine
concerning Due Process (liberty) and Equal Protection, both federal and state,
requires an inquiry into whether laws that are challenged are rationally related
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to a legitimate governmental purpose or end.117 The analysis of purposes or
ends required in these contexts is not peculiarly Aristotelian or teleological nor
is it necessarily a moral inquiry. And there is nothing about liberalism that
precludes this conventional inquiry. To the contrary, basic principles of liberal
legitimacy require such an inquiry. If a law is not rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose or end, it is not a legitimate exercise of
political power in the most elemental sense. And, under conventional
constitutional law doctrine, it is not constitutional. This general requirement
extends far beyond the “culture war” issues like same-sex marriage implicating
moral disagreement and political conflict. It applies to analyses of purposes or
ends that are not moral in any ordinary sense.118
Second, the conclusions that laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy “demean
the existence” of gays and lesbians119 or that laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples “confer[] an official stamp of approval on the destructive
stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to
opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect”120 are not necessarily
Aristotelian and are not off limits to liberalism. One can interpret these
holdings in Dworkinian terms: that the challenged laws deny equal concern
and respect.121 Alternatively, one can put them in characteristically liberal
terms as denials of dignity. That is how the Court of Appeal for Ontario put it
in Halpern v. Toronto: “[T]he existing common law definition of marriage”122
“offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships.”123 And that is how
Dworkin argues for a right to same-sex marriage.124 That is also how the
California Supreme Court framed its decision striking down a law limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples (as we will show below).125 What is more,
one can frame these conclusions in terms of a Rawlsian liberal concern to
secure the status of free and equal citizenship for all,126 homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike. From this standpoint, one can condemn the laws at issue
in Lawrence and Goodridge for denying gays and lesbians this status by
demeaning their existence, by denying the equal moral worth of their
relationships, or by failing to accord them the common benefits of citizenship.
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In short, all of these formulations comfortably express political liberalism’s
aspiration to secure the common and guaranteed status of free and equal
citizenship to all. There is nothing in political liberalism that precludes such
formulations. To the contrary, political liberalism requires these conclusions.
Finally, despite Sandel’s suggestions, there is nothing in these formulations
that entails that government is furthering a particular comprehensive
conception of the good and thus that they are off limits to political liberalism
or flout political liberalism’s commitment to public reason. Political liberalism
as Rawls formulates it precludes government from imposing or promoting a
particular comprehensive conception of the good,127 for example, that of the
Catholic Church. It does not preclude government from pursuing moral goods
or public values that are common to a number of competing comprehensive
conceptions – for example, to recall the moral goods Chief Justice Marshall
invokes in Goodridge: commitment, mutuality, companionship, intimacy,
fidelity, and family.128 It is one thing to say, as Rawls does, that political
liberalism rules out governmental imposition of a particular comprehensive
conception of the good. It is quite another to say that political liberalism rules
out governmental creation of institutions like marriage that pursue moral goods
like those stated above. It does not.129 Nor does political liberalism preclude
justifying constitutional rights on the basis of the moral goods promoted by
protecting them.
In sum, Sandel provides a powerful and illuminating reading of the
Goodridge same-sex marriage decision in terms of moral goods and purposes.
But political and constitutional liberals can and should embrace Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion. Not only does it not exceed the bounds of political
liberalism or of public reason – it is, in Rawls’s terms, an exemplar of public
reason.
V.

THE CALIFORNIA MARRIAGE CASES

Like Goodridge, the recent California cases (both state and federal)
concerning the definition of marriage provide a valuable opportunity to explore
127

Id. at 37.
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129 Political liberalism holds that “the family is part of the basic structure, since one of its
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the promise of Sandel’s proposed Aristotelian method for resolving the debate
over same-sex marriage, which foregrounds questions of “competing notions
of honor and virtue, pride and recognition.”130 At the same time, also like
Goodridge, they suggest that his dichotomy between a liberal approach and a
virtue approach is too stark. Although the success of the ballot initiative
Proposition 8, amending the California Constitution to define marriage as the
union between one man and one woman, in effect nullified the California
Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage Cases, the court’s opinion still
warrants analysis as an instructive melding of rights and virtues arguments.
What distinguishes both the state and federal cases in California from prior
litigation over same-sex marriage is that they raise and thoroughly address the
question of whether it is constitutional to afford same-sex couples an
alternative legal status – that of domestic partnership, to which the material
benefits and the respective rights and responsibilities of marriage attach –
while reserving the status of marriage exclusively to same-sex couples. This
helps to focus attention on what Metz helpfully calls the meaning side of
marriage, as distinct from the material side.131 It is a new stage in the struggle
for marriage equality. Framing the question in this way helps people to hone
in on the significance of the label “marriage.” Here Sandel’s intuition that
what is at stake is questions about worth is helpful: are same-sex unions
viewed as equally worthy of official recognition as the unions of opposite-sex
couples? Or is the creation of an alternative legal status based on a judgment
that such relationships are inferior and not as worthy? So, too, these opinions
afford examples of courts engaging in substantive moral argument and
interpretive reasoning about the purposes of marriage. We focus primarily on
the decision of the California Supreme Court from 2008, In re Marriage
Cases,132 and then conclude with a mention of the decision of the federal
district court invalidating Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger.133 It is
necessary briefly to give some background.
By referendum in a 2000 election, California voters adopted Proposition 22,
which provides that “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.”134 Nonetheless, California had become one of the
most hospitable environments for same-sex couples. Since the enactment of a
law in 1999, same-sex partners have been permitted to register with the
Secretary of State as domestic partners.135 The preamble to California’s
domestic partner law states its goals: promoting equality for “caring and
committed couples,” “promoting family relationships and protecting family
130
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members during life crises,” and reducing “discrimination on the bases of sex
and sexual orientation.”136 The legislature has steadily expanded the domestic
partnership law, culminating in the dramatic expansion of the Domestic Partner
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 (Domestic Partner Act).137 The upshot
is that, at least since 2005, domestic partnership has functioned in California as
a near-equivalent to marriage.
In re Marriage Cases takes up the question of whether the state must go
further, and provide same-sex couples with access to civil marriage. In a
lengthy opinion, authored by Justice Ronald George, the California Supreme
Court reached two basic conclusions: (1) that the fundamental right to marry
protected by the state constitution’s due process clause includes the right to
marry a person of the same sex138 and (2) that reserving the status of marriage
for heterosexuals, while limiting gays and lesbians to the second-class
domestic partnership status, constitutes unconstitutional discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in violation of the state constitution’s equal
protection clause.139 On the face of it, these two holdings seem to correspond
to what Sandel characterizes as the insufficient arguments of freedom of choice
and nondiscrimination, respectively.
Within the small number of states that have granted some kind of formal
recognition to same-sex couples, there is a divide between those who grant full
access to marriage and those who create an alternative legal status to provide
comparable benefits. Illustrating the latter approach, Vermont’s high court, in
Baker v. State of Vermont,140 allowed the legislature the discretion to create an
alternative legal status, civil union, to provide common benefits to same-sex
couples (although the legislature subsequently in 2009 extended civil marriage
to same-sex couples).141 So did New Jersey’s high court, in Lewis v. Harris.142
Illustrating the former approach, Massachusetts’s high court, in an advisory
opinion subsequent to Goodridge, rebuffed the state Senate when it asked
whether adopting a civil union law for same-sex couples rather than allowing
marriage would be sufficient. The court held that the “dissimilitude between
the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous,” but rather
assigns “same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.”143
The Supreme Court of California joined Massachusetts in believing that the
name “marriage” – or at least the withholding of the name – means
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something.144 According to the majority opinion, the right to marry as
protected by the state constitution is a “couple’s right to have their family
relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded other officially
recognized families.”145 Making the name of their family relationship turn on
the identity of the parties undermines that equal dignity and respect. Perhaps
the state could, the majority suggests, strip all unions of the name “marriage”
and call them something else146 – that would be the disestablishment Policy 3
mentioned above.147 As a matter of both due process and equal protection,
however, the state may not maintain one status for opposite-sex couples and
another for same-sex ones.148
The distinctiveness of the California Supreme Court’s approach is manifest
when compared with that of New Jersey. In Lewis v. Harris, the state’s highest
court said that the naming question does not implicate constitutional questions,
but is instead best resolved in the “crucible of the democratic process.”149 The
majority concluded that constitutionally requiring access to “marriage” – rather
than simply to the rights and responsibilities “of marriage” – would force
“social acceptance” upon the citizens of New Jersey, who may not be ready for
it.150 Any change in the longstanding definition of marriage, the majority
believed, ought to come from the legislature, through “civil dialogue and
reasoned discourse.”151 This reasoning seems to treat the question of who may
use the name “marriage” for their relationships as a question of policy, not
constitutional rights. By contrast, the California court emphatically stated that
its role is not to make decisions based on policy or what is popular, but to
interpret the constitution and to protect rights under it.152
In addition to marriage’s symbolic importance, the California Supreme
Court identified other reasons why a two-tier system denies same-sex couples
equal dignity and respect. To begin, the entrenched bias against gays and
lesbians raises special concerns about a separate-but-equal approach. Drawing
the analogy to race, the court observed that California’s barring interracial
marriages would have been unconstitutional even if the state had made unions
using “alternative nomenclature such as “transracial unions” available to
interracial couples.153 The court also pointed out the practical problem, evident
from Vermont’s and New Jersey’s experiences with civil unions, that the
public understands marriage, but does not understand alternatives like civil
144
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unions or domestic partnerships.154 Finally, the court identified the risk that
having separate tracks for opposite-sex and same-sex relationships may send a
general message that government regards gay men and lesbians and their
families as less worthy of respect.155
Thus, questions of worth do play an obvious and important role in the
court’s opinion. And the opinion seems to track Sandel’s argument that the
debate about same-sex marriage is “fundamentally” about whether same-sex
couples’ unions are “worthy” of the “honor and recognition” our society
confers through state-sanctioned marriage.156 Clearly, the court resolves this
question in the affirmative.
But a critical step in being able to reach that judgment, says Sandel, is an
Aristotelian inquiry into the purposes of the social institution of marriage and
argument about “the virtues it honors” and rewards.157 This requires inquiry
into whether same-sex unions “fulfill the purposes of the social institution of
marriage,” such that including gay and lesbian couples is a matter of the “just
distribution of offices and honors.”158
How does the court resolve questions about the purposes of marriage? Is it
possible to detect the two strands of argument that Sandel identifies – the
liberal, nonjudgmental strand and the Aristotelian, purposive strand? Does the
court rely on a strategy of liberal neutrality emphasizing freedom of choice,
avoiding controversial moral and religious argument? Or does it engage in
substantive moral argument? As in Goodridge, so in Marriage Cases, we
contend, both strands play a part in the court’s resolution of the constitutional
issues.
The California Supreme Court’s decision offers perhaps the richest account
to date of why marriage is a vital social institution, significant for society as
well as for those who marry.159 Tamara Metz observes that the opinion “came
closer than any other to presenting a complete and compelling constitutional
defense of the establishment of marriage.”160 Marriage jurisprudence, Metz
accurately says, has both an individual rights strand, which Sandel might well
identify with a liberal form of argument, and an institutionalist strand, which
stresses society’s interest in marriage and the instrumental value of marriage as
a foundational social institution.161 She contends that the California Supreme
Court moved beyond dominant “liberal discourse” about marriage by
observing that protecting the right to marry requires more than merely leaving
people alone, but also requires the state “to provide – define, confer, and
154
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regulate – a legal framework.”162 Goodridge itself made this point very
clearly, speaking both of “freedom from” and “freedom to” being at stake in
the right to marry.163
In ruling that gay male and lesbian couples were entitled to marry, the
California Supreme Court emphatically stressed the continuing importance of
marriage both for individuals and for society,164 melding an individual rights
perspective with an institutionalist perspective. In doing so, it drew on many
traditional arguments about why marriage matters. In this sense, the California
ruling might actually be read as a conservative decision: it recognizes and
seeks to preserve the important functions of marriage, in an age when many
couples simply cohabit and many people choose to be single. At the same
time, the court’s opinion is clearly also a progressive one, for it concludes that
appeals to history and tradition alone are insufficient constitutional bases for
excluding same-sex couples from this fundamental institution.165 It is also
progressive in the sense that it considers and rejects a number of contemporary
arguments made by the marriage movement against redefining marriage.166
What are the purposes of marriage? Why is it fundamental? The California
Supreme Court emphasizes the unique role of marriage in providing “official
recognition” to a family relationship.167 In doing so, the court makes use of
several traditional arguments typically used by opponents of same-sex
marriage. Precisely because marriage is – as conservatives often have argued –
unique in offering couples societal respect and dignity, the court reasoned that
the state may not deny it to same-sex couples without undermining
constitutional guarantees of rights to privacy, liberty, and equality.
From a long line of federal and state precedents about privacy, liberty,
equality, and the right to marry, the California Supreme Court distills one basic
idea: that the fundamental right to marry embraces the right of an individual to
establish, with a loved one of his or her choice, an officially recognized family
relationship.168 Here, the court makes what Sandel might call a liberal rights
argument about choice. But it is wedded to an argument about the worth of
official recognition. Because civil marriage provides the institutional
framework for families to secure such recognition, the state may not relegate
same-sex couples to an alternative status without denying them a “core
element[]” of the right to marry.169
The California Supreme Court elaborates upon many reasons why both
society and individuals have a stake in the institution of civil marriage.
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Ultimately, it asks, “[w]hat is society’s interest in marriage?”170 Or, put
another way, what are marriage’s purposes? First, the court tells us, there is
the channelling function of the family, as the “basic unit of our society.”171
Older California cases state that the family “channels biological drives that
might otherwise become socially destructive,” giving order to sexuality and
procreation.172 Second, civil marriage also facilitates parents’ providing for
“the care and education of children in a stable environment.”173 Third, society
relies on marital and family relationships, which are attended by legal
obligations of support, to provide crucial care for dependents and to relieve the
public from, or at least share with it, the burden of support. Society favors
marriage by linking many rights and responsibilities to it.174 These are
institutionalist arguments that stress what marriage does for society.
But marriage, the court insists, is also of “fundamental significance” for
those who seek to marry.175 Thus, one cannot look at marriage only from an
institutionalist perspective – that is, how marriage “serve[s] the interests of
society”176 – and ignore the individual rights perspective – that marriage is also
a “fundamental right,” an “integral component of an individual’s interest in
personal autonomy” protected by state constitutional liberty and privacy
rights.177 Marriage “cannot properly be understood as simply the right to enter
into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses to establish and
retain it.”178 In elaborating the importance of marriage to individuals, the court
makes arguments sounding more in liberal themes about a right to form and act
on a conception of the good life. Marriage, for example, offers “the most
socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in
the course of a lifetime.”179 Indeed, constitutional precedents speak of it as
part of the “pursuit of happiness.”180 The court notes that, of course, people
can have and raise children outside of marriage, but “the institution of civil
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See id. at 423.
Id. at 422. On the “channelling” function of family law, see Carl E. Schneider, The
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178 Id.
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marriage affords official governmental sanction and sanctuary to the family
unit.”181 Civil marriage – as a public statement – affords persons a public
affirmation of commitment and a form of self-expression. It also enmeshes
married persons in a broader network of extended family, as well as in the
“broader family social structure” that is a vital part of community life.182
Families provide a place in which personality may be developed, intimate
association pursued, and values and commitments generated that reach beyond
the family.
Those who argue against extending marriage to same-sex couples often
appeal to some of these traditional functions of marriage. For instance, the
channelling function of the family – and of family law – provided a rationale
for preserving the traditional definition of marriage in Hernandez v. Robles,183
in which New York’s highest court upheld the state’s ban on same-sex
marriage, and in Justice Cordy’s dissent in Goodridge.184 Opponents of samesex-marriage argued before the California Supreme Court that because of the
historical link between marriage and procreation, the constitutional right to
marry should be limited to opposite-sex couples.185 Altering the definition of
marriage, they argued, would send a message that marriage no longer has to do
with procreation, or with a child’s needing a mother and a father.186
How did the California Supreme Court resolve this debate about marriage’s
definition and purposes? For one thing, it looked to marriage law to reject the
arguments centered around procreation. It observed that, although channelling
procreation may be a reason for marriage, the constitutional right to marry has
never been confined only to couples capable of procreating.187 Moreover, the
court held that promoting “responsible procreation” among heterosexuals is not
a constitutionally sufficient reason to deny same-sex couples the fundamental
right to marry.188 As the court saw it, the state’s goal of encouraging stable
two-parent family relationships could be served by extending the benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples (who after all often raise children together).189
The California Supreme Court observed that, although providing a stable
setting for procreation and childrearing is one important purpose of marriage, it
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important functions, the institution of marriage has systematically provided for the
regulation of heterosexual behavior, brought order to the resulting procreation, and ensured
a stable family structure in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized.”).
185 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 430.
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is not the only one.190 The court also conceived of marriage as an adult
relationship; state and federal precedents link marriage to adult happiness and
to “personal enrichment.”191 The court’s resistance to making marriage
primarily or solely “about” children and not also about adult intimacy is a
notable interpretation of the purposes of marriage that recurs in California’s
federal marriage case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger.192 Moreover, the California
Supreme Court pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutional right of married couples to use contraception (thus preventing
procreation).193
The California Supreme Court also considered and rejected another
argument, already mentioned above, made by the marriage movement: that
allowing same-sex couples to marry will “send a message” that marriage has
nothing to do with procreation and child rearing, and that it is “immaterial” to
the state whether a child is raised by her or his biological parents.194 The court
held that recognizing the constitutional rights of same-sex couples to marry
diminishes neither the constitutional rights of opposite-sex couples nor the
legal responsibilities of biological parents.195 If anything, the court concluded,
recognizing these rights “simply confirms that a stable two-parent family
relationship, supported by the state’s official recognition and protection, is
equally as important for the numerous children in California who are being
raised by same-sex couples as for those being raised by opposite-sex
couples.”196 As New York’s Chief Judge Judith Kaye wrote in her dissent to
Hernandez: “There are enough marriage licenses to go around for
everyone.”197 The court reasoned here that the good of stability is relevant not
just to households formed by opposite-sex couples, but also to those formed by
same-sex couples. Implicitly, there is a moral judgment that these households
not only will benefit from this recognition and support, but also that they are
equally worthy of it.
We want to close by reiterating that the California Supreme Court opinion
can be seen as being at once progressive and conservative. It is progressive in
its unwillingness to defer completely to history and tradition when defining
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constitutional rights. Though the State of California had urged the court to
embrace the longstanding definition of marriage as a union between a man and
a woman, the court looked more critically at history and tradition. Drawing on
its own precedents, and subjecting these arguments to critical scrutiny, the
court stated that “history alone is not invariably an appropriate guide for
determining the meaning and scope of this fundamental constitutional
guarantee.”198 In rejecting wholesale deference to tradition, the court insisted
that neither marriage nor constitutional concepts are static. In this sense, its
reasoning resembles that of Goodridge, which spoke of marriage as an
“evolving paradigm.”199 The court also invoked Justice Kennedy in Lawrence:
“[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”200
Yet the opinion can be seen as conservative in its strong emphasis on the
unique symbolic value of marriage and its invocation of the primacy of
marriage. Legal scholars and activists who argue for de-centering marriage by
developing domestic partnership laws and other legal statuses alternative to
civil marriage201 might criticize the majority’s insistence on the inadequacy of
domestic partnership as a legal alternative to marriage. The court’s marshaling
of traditional arguments about the importance of marriage – along with its
emphasis on the risk that domestic partnership will be perceived as lesser and
as inferior – may lead some progressives to lament that a real opportunity for
breaking the monopoly that marriage holds on our social and legal imagination
was lost. While we can argue about the society we ideally should have, for
now the California Supreme Court’s point is cogent: so long as marriage exists
and is only open to opposite-sex couples, a marriage/domestic partnership twotrack system conveys a very real and serious insult to same-sex couples,
communicating that their family relationships are not worthy of equal dignity
and respect.
Far from resolving the controversy over same-sex marriage, the California
Supreme Court’s opinion was a catalyst for the Proposition 8 campaign to
amend the California Constitution by defining marriage as the union of one
man and one woman.202 These issues of worth and of the symbolic message of
marriage versus domestic partnership are also central in the ongoing federal
litigation concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 8, as demonstrated in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger. There the federal district court concluded that views

198

Id. at 399.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d, 941, 967 (Mass. 2003).
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about the inferiority of same-sex couples and their families animated the
campaign for the proposition,203 and held that Proposition 8 violated both the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.204 The case is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit, which
recently issued an order staying further proceedings and certifying a question
to the California Supreme Court concerning whether the proponents of
Proposition 8 have standing to defend its constitutionality in court when the
State of California has refused to do so.205 The case may eventually end up
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Chief Judge Vaughn Walker’s lengthy
opinion is heavily laden with findings of fact and citations to specific evidence
on these findings to support his conclusions of law.206 Whatever the ultimate
outcome of the case on appeal, Chief Judge Walker’s opinion provides a rich
example of the intertwining of liberal and civic republican arguments –
autonomy together with worth – in justifying a right to same-sex marriage.207
CONCLUSION
To recapitulate: as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Goodridge, so did the California Supreme Court in the Marriage Cases present
liberal arguments sounding in freedom of choice and nondiscrimination
alongside Aristotelian or civic republican arguments sounding in purposes,
moral goods, and worth. Sandel may be right that the latter arguments help
resolve the issue. But we maintain that both types of argument can stand side
by side. And what we said above about Goodridge in relation to political
liberalism and conventional constitutional doctrine applies as well to the
203
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decision of the California Supreme Court. For its analysis of purposes and
ends sits comfortably within conventional constitutional law doctrine with no
need of Aristotle or teleological analysis to make sense of it. And its holding
fits comfortably with familiar liberal commitments to equal concern and
respect, dignity, and securing the status of free and equal citizenship for all.

